The debate about bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy ran its most prominent course in the 1980s, with the last substantial contribution concluding that any general statements on bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy 'are obviously misleading ' (Matthews and Ravenhill 1988, 19) . An yet, notwithstanding such cautions, and given the obvious continuity in many aspects of Australia's relations with the world, it is difficult to fight the notion that the country does, indeed, at least to some extent and on certain issues, enjoy a bipartisan foreign policy. As classical writing on political parties, and especially two-party Westminster political systems, has made clear, in order to secure electoral success, major parties will 'agree on any issues that a majority of citizens strongly favour', thereby becoming 'catch-all parties' which pursue 'votes at the expense of ideology', trying to appeal to an ever wider audience (Downs 1957, 297; Kirchheimer 1966; Williams 2009, 539) . This process decreases any distinguishable policy differences between the major parties, relegating such differences mainly to the periphery of their political agendas.
While Trevor Matthews and John Ravenhill were right to point out that general statements about bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy can be 'misleading', given the structure of the country's political system and how its two main 'catch-all' political parties operate, it can be suggested that Australian foreign policy has in some fundamental aspects enjoyed a high degree of bipartisanship, regardless of how it is defined (1988, (9) (10) (11) (12) . This much was reiterated recently by Matt McDonald (2015, 656) , who noted that Australian 'foreign policy is more readily characterised by continuity than change, particularly on key issues'. Regardless of their political rhetoric and adherence to distinct foreign policy outlooks, both of Australia's major political parties accept the same key pillars of the country's engagement with the world. Hence, both the ALP and the Coalition are interested in greater engagement with the Asia-Pacific region; maintaining close ties with major economic and security partners such as the USA, European Union, China, Japan, Indonesia and New Zealand; and focusing development cooperation largely on the immediate region, particularly Papua New Guinea and the Pacific islands. Hence, in its fundamentals (the relationships and issues that are perceived to be of primal and immediate economic and security importance for the country), Australian foreign policy does appear overall to exhibit a strong degree of bipartisanship. 1 However, building on the work of Matthews and Ravenhill, the argument of this article is that, on what can be considered the periphery of Australia's foreign policy agenda, which deals with relationships and issues that have traditionally been conceptualised as of minimal and less obvious economic and security importance for the country, there is an observable difference in both the rhetoric and substance of the foreign policies pursued by ideologically different governments. The purpose of this article is to utilise the example of Australia's engagement with Africa since the mid-1990s to add further empirical strength to the argument that there is, indeed, partisanship in Australia's overall foreign policy agenda. 2 The article is structured in three sections. The first briefly outlines the ALP's and the Coalition's foreign policy outlooks before discussing the idea of (bi)partisanship in Australian foreign policy, particularly on the periphery of the country's foreign policy agenda. The second section analyses key ALP and Coalition foreign policy documents in order to highlight the rhetorical difference in the conceptualisation of Australia's place in the world and its engagement with Africa. The final section outlines how these different conceptualisations impacted the substance of Australia's foreign policy engagement with African states and issues between 1996 and 2015.
Political party foreign policy outlooks and (bi)partisanship in Australian foreign policy
The conservative side of Australian politics generally subscribes to a set of ideas about Australia's place in the world broadly described as 'traditionalism'. This traditionalism refers to a realist and liberal understanding of international relations, which results in an emphasis on the maximisation of the country's power through the maintenance of close ties with culturally, linguistically and politically similar 'great and powerful friends' (Renouf 1979, 492-493; Wesley and Warren 2000, 13; Gyngell and Wesley 2007, 11) . As a result, while there have been slight changes over the past 60 years, the Coalition's foreign policy outlook is focused very strongly on regional affairs, conceiving of Australia as a significant regional power concerned with fostering traditional partnerships with key allies, and preferring bilateral management of foreign affairs (Ravenhill 1998, 321) .
On the other hand, Labor's approach to foreign policy has traditionally conceptualised Australia's place in the world as that of an active 'middle power' keen on utilising multilateral architectures, exhibiting a strong Asia-Pacific orientation, but also looking beyond just the immediate region for foreign policy engagement and relationships (Evans 1997, 18; Cotton and Ravenhill 2011, 1-2) . Labor governments tend to label themselves as 'good international citizens' who see a place for values in foreign policy as well as selfinterest, and focus on creative and proactive foreign policy thinking that seeks to lead where possible, rather than simply follow global trends or the desires of great powers (Evans and Grant 1995, 34-35; Ravenhill 1998, 321; Wesley and Warren 2000, 19) .
However, as some scholars have suggested, regardless of its political ownership, 'Australian governments since the mid-1940s have at various times and to varying degrees supported the notion of Australia as a middle power' and 'it has been one of the most enduring themes in Australian foreign policy discourse for over sixty years' (Ungerer 2007, 551) . Carl Ungerer (2007, 540, 550) has argued that 'Australia's self-identification as a middle power has been one of the strongest influences on the form and conduct of Australian diplomatic practice' and 'the middle power concept is perhaps the closest that Australia has ever come to articulating a self-conscious theory of foreign policy '. 3 As Robert Cox (1989, 827) once observed, a middle power is perhaps best understood as 'a role in search of an actor'. Such a view is complemented by a significant amount of literature which has, over the years, critically interrogated the concept in the hope of developing an analytically robust understanding (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1994; Ravenhill 1998; Chapnick 1999; Jordaan 2003; Ungerer 2007; Beeson 2011; Sussex 2011; Patience 2014; . While a review of this literature is beyond the scope of this article, what is particularly relevant for the purpose of the present discussion is that although Australian foreign policymakers such as Herbert Evatt, Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser and Gareth Evans periodically invoked Australia's status as a middle power, such conceptualisations of Australia's place in the world were largely absent during the Menzies years, or abandoned by the Howard and Abbott governments (Ravenhill 1998, 321; Goldsworthy 2001; Ungerer 2007, 548-549) . Hence, leading directly into the discussion of bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy is the issue of whether a country stops being a middle power when its government stops identifying with the term (A. Carr 2014, 76) .
Whether Australia is or is not conceptualised as a middle power actually appears to have little relevance for the fundamentals of Australian foreign policy. Writing about Australia's external policy under Labor in the late 1970s, Henry Albinski (1977, 351) argued that, under the Whitlam government, there were 'real shifts of emphasis in both substance and style from what had been done under L-CP [Liberal-Country Party] governments, but continuity was preserved in the basic outlines of Australia's external policy'. Discussing the same time period, Hedley Bull (1975, 34) noted that 'in its perception of our interests and obligations in the world the Labor Government has not made any sharp break with its [Coalition] predecessors'. Similarly, discussing the Hawke Labor government in the mid-1980s, T. B. Millar (1985, 14, 15) could not observe 'significant differences' in Labor's foreign policies as compared to the Fraser Coalition government which preceded it, arguing that there was an 'emerging national bipartisanship' in Australian foreign policy. Even more recent examinations of the country's foreign policy have argued that there 'could be little argument' that both ALP and Coalition governments employed multilateral and bilateral means of advancing a bipartisan set of trade and security relationships with a focus on Asian engagement (Sussex 2011, 549) .
However, views on bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy were challenged by Matthews and Ravenhill (1988, 12) , who utilised a 'survey of the attitudes of 200 Australian leaders towards foreign policy issues', conducted in late 1982 and early 1983, to disagree with such generalisations. Although their study highlighted some important issues, its major limitation was that it was based on a survey of opinions, and did not discuss actual foreign policies and actions taken on issues where personal opinion may have actually differed from the party's officially articulated and enacted policy. Nevertheless, Matthews and Ravenhill's study offers a good starting point for the present examination of partisanship in engagement with Africa. What the study made clear-and is still relevant almost three decades later-is that there are partisan differences on issues traditionally perceived as sitting at the periphery of Australia's foreign policy agenda. Matthews and Ravenhill (1988, 12-17) found that, on the issue of Australia's bilateral relations, strong bipartisan support was found for relations with the USA, China, Japan, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand. However, there were clear partisan differences on the issue of South Africa's political importance for Australia. Furthermore, on the issue of the United Nations' (UN's) utility in resolving international and Pacific problems, there was strong bipartisanship, while on the issue of the economic and political importance of the Commonwealth for Australia, or the Organization of African Unity's helpfulness in solving international problems, there were again partisan differences. Finally, on the issues of North-South relations and humanitarian concerns (refugees and aid), there was broad bipartisan support, while on the question of race and whether, for example, 'race relations in Southern Africa were a problem affecting Australia's vital interests', there were partisan differences (Matthews and Ravenhill 1988, 17) .
Keeping in mind the above-outlined foreign policy outlooks, according to which ALP governments should be more inclined than their Coalition counterparts towards multilateralism and foreign policy engagement outside of the immediate region, the analysis of this survey highlights somewhat mixed results. For example, on the question of South Africa's political importance for Australia, it was the ALP Members of Parliament (federal and state) who thought the country to be of less importance, rather than their Coalition counterparts. On the question of the Commonwealth's economic and political importance, it was again ALP Members of Parliament who found it less important for Australia. However, on the question of the Organization of African Unity's helpfulness in solving international problems, ALP Members of Parliament rated it as more helpful compared with their Coalition counterparts. Finally, two-thirds of ALP Members of Parliament agreed that race relations in South Africa were affecting Australia's vital interests, as compared to only one-third of the Coalition's Members of Parliament.
Whether these results can be reconciled with proclaimed political party foreign policy outlooks is of secondary importance for the present purposes. What they highlight is a snapshot of personal foreign policy preferences from a specific point in time by a wide array of state and federal Members of Parliament, and it needs hardly pointing out that such preferences are not immutable and need not reflect the official party position. 4 After all, they would be influenced by a host of issues, such as education, previous knowledge of foreign policy issues, personal preferences and values, etc.
Overall, the more important issue recognised by their study is that, although Matthews and Ravenhill caution that in discussions of Australian foreign policy 'general statements are obviously misleading', Australian foreign policy towards certain issues does receive bipartisan support, while on others it does not. This is not immutable and can change, and it is the argument of this article that it is at the periphery of Australia's broader foreign policy agenda that we can observe some substantial partisan differences, which go beyond just political rhetoric.
The reasons why issues at the periphery of Australia's foreign policy agenda experience partisan differences are many. Some of them include the aforementioned nature of the country's political system and 'catch-all' parties, where substantial policy differences are relegated to the margins of the political agenda. Others include a perceived lack of public and national interest in these policy spaces. As McDonald (2015, 656) has recently argued, foreign policy in general 'has not featured prominently on Australia's policy agenda', and this is especially so at the periphery of that agenda, which receives little media attention. Although public opinion may hold an 'increasing salience' in foreign policymaking, as McDonald (2015, 652) demonstrates, this is predominantly on issues and regions that are considered fundamental to the country's security and economic wellbeing. Where such public opinion 'pressures' are not present, foreign policymaking is predominantly elite-driven, in which case political party foreign policy outlooks have greater salience for explaining the direction of foreign policy.
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The differing foreign policy outlooks of Australia's two major political parties may indeed be nothing more than electoral differentiation myths and, as far as the fundamental aspects and relationships of the country's foreign policy are concerned, when in government both parties exhibit a very similar foreign policy focus and direction. However, as the example of foreign policy towards Africa since the Howard years highlights, it is at the periphery of the Australian foreign policy agenda that such myths can be salient drivers of foreign policy (dis)engagement. As Bull (1975, 32) observed some four decades ago, a substantial difference between the Coalition's and the ALP's foreign policy outlooks has been the latter's attempts to 'cultivate a special relationship with the countries of the Third World': 'It is this aspect of the Labor Government's foreign policy which, more than any other, expresses the Labor Party's distinctive ideology and tradition, and which most divides it from the conservative Opposition'.
Party foreign policy outlooks and partisanship on engagement with Africa
The Coalition: regionalism and bilateralism leave little room for engagement with Africa
One of the simplest ways to examine political party foreign policy outlooks is through their key foreign policy documents. 6 There are several such documents from the past 20 years which give a clear indication of both the Coalition's and the ALP's foreign policy outlooks.
The key documents from the Howard years are the government's two foreign policy White Papers. What both have in common is a general adherence to, and perpetuation of, a distinct Coalition foreign policy outlook and minimal regard for, or interest in, engagement with African issues. The first White Paper, In the National Interest, reasserted the Coalition's 'realist' foreign policy thinking, dispensing with the language of 'good international citizenship' so prominent during the Keating years, and emphasising the 'practical' and 'hard-headed' pursuit of the country's national interests largely through bilateral relations:
A central feature of the Government's approach to foreign and trade policy is the importance it places on bilateral relationships as a means of advancing Australian interests … The greater part of Australia's international efforts is, however, bilateral, and bilateral relationships are the basic building block for effective regional and global strategies. Further developing important established bilateral relationships, carefully nurturing newer relationships which engage key Australian interests, and expanding others which offer opportunities for Australia will be the core part of the Government's diplomatic activity (DFAT 1997, iii) .
This heavy emphasis on bilateralism was followed by a caution on the limitations of multilateralism:
Linked to the Government's focus on bilateral relations is a selective approach to the multilateral agenda. Australia must concentrate its involvement in multilateral issues in those areas where its national interests are closely engaged … Australia must be realistic about what multilateral institutions such as the United Nations system can deliver. International organisations can only accomplish what their member states enable them to accomplish (ibid.).
In terms of engagement with African issues, the whole document contained six references to 'Africa' (and none to any African country except for South Africa), only one of which offered any substantive policy direction:
[Australia's interests] will remain focused on the South African market, which will also provide a base for trading into all the countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Government will actively explore opportunities for mining investment and equipment sales elsewhere (DFAT 1997, 67-68) .
Hence, the Howard government in its early days conceptualised engagement with Africa exclusively through commercial opportunities in South Africa.
The second foreign policy White Paper, Advancing the National Interest, merely reiterated the Coalition's already established foreign policy outlook. Australian foreign policy was again portrayed as realistic and pragmatic, with its main tasks being the advancement of the national interest, and arguably the only major novelty being the heavy emphasis on the fight against global terrorism-an issue that received only marginal attention in the previous White Paper ( DFAT 2003, 43, 58, 95, 96, 115) .
The 2003 White Paper again highlighted the Coalition's preference for bilateral management of foreign affairs:
Judgments about priorities are crucial. Not all bilateral relations are equally important for Australia. Not all regional associations or multilateral activities will enhance the prosperity and security of Australians … In a complex and fluid world, with an enormous and growing international agenda, we must be pragmatic and clear-sighted about which relationships, which issues and which multilateral activities are most likely to advance the national interest (DFAT 2003, 7) .
The 2003 White Paper devoted one page to foreign policy engagement with Africa. In the chapter on wider global interests, Australia's interests in Africa were examined, with the main issues being Zimbabwe's poor governance and Australia's aid to Africa. The best summary of Australian foreign policy interests in Africa during these years was offered at the very outset of the discussion, where the document stated that 'Australia's interests in Africa are engaged most directly through our relationship with South Africa and our membership of the Commonwealth' (DFAT 2003, 110) . This one sentence, in fact, best summarises the overall focus of Australian foreign policy in Africa through the whole four terms of the Howard government.
In addition to highlighting the Coalition's traditional foreign policy outlook and understanding of Australia's place in the world, which preferred a bilateral management of foreign affairs and predominant focus on the region, these documents also offer a clear insight into the Coalition's understanding of foreign policy engagement with Africa. Although the Howard government professed global as well as regional interests, with regard to Africa such interests were minimal. Aside from engagement with South Africa (Australia's only substantial commercial partner on the continent), the only other conduit for foreign policy engagement with African issues was through the Commonwealth. Hence, the Coalition did not see any other opportunities for political or security interests or engagement with African states and, given the primacy of economic considerations in foreign policy engagement with the African continent, it is no wonder that engagement with South Africa was the only foreign policy engagement the Howard government cared to develop.
Just prior to the September 2013 federal election, the Abbott-led Coalition released The Coalition's Policy for Foreign Affairs document, which outlined its vision for Australia's engagement with the world. The document rather unambiguously invoked the same foreign policy emphases and preferences that were dominant during the Howard years. The emphasis was on advancing 'Australia's core strategic and economic interests', the primacy of 'economic diplomacy' in the pursuit of those interests, and a traditional focus on deepening 'Australia's relations with our region' (Coalition 2013, 2, 3). At first glance, the main and only novelty in terms of foreign policy direction was a focus on the 'Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean region'. This policy paper also made it clear that, if elected to government, the Coalition would 'refocus foreign policy on Australia's true international interests', chief amongst which were relations with the USA, Japan, Indonesia, China and India (Coalition 2013, 4) . Finally, with regard to Africa, the whole 10-page document contained only one reference to the continent (and none to any African country), again following the Howard government's tradition of setting it in the 'generic' context of wider global interests: 'We will refocus Australia's foreign policy resources on advancing the national interest by strengthening relations with a wide range of other partners in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East and Africa' (Coalition 2013, 5). ). This document, although explicitly utilising the term 'middle power' only once, nevertheless offers a review of the ALP's foreign policy outlook. For example, it criticises the conservative approach to foreign policy, which maintains that 'there are no rights and wrongs in foreign policy-only interests' and 'that any debates about morality should be confined to our territorial limits', accepting the world 'as it is' and 'regarding any attempts at improving the international order as idealistic nonsense'. This is contrasted with the ALP tradition, which believes that 'foreign policy, like domestic policy, is about both interests and values', which allows a country to remain 'hard headed' in the pursuit of its interests while at the same time remaining compassionate and a 'good international citizen ' (ALP 2004, 6-7) .
Of most interest to the present discussion is the prominence afforded to the ALP's traditional adherence to multilateralism (as opposed to the Coalition's emphasis on bilateralism). The document makes clear that 'Australia's commitment to the UN multilateral system has enjoyed bipartisan support for half a century', which was based 'on the logic that as a middle power, Australia could deliver better outcomes through a multilateral system, both for itself and for states with similar values and interests'. It further argues that a Labor government would 'reaffirm its commitment to the UN and the broader multilateral system ' (ALP 2004, 93, 95) .
Finally, and in contrast to the Coalition's foreign policy documents discussed above, the ALP's document also deals more substantively with African issues. It argues for a greater foreign policy and developmental engagement with African issues:
Australian policy makers have largely ignored Africa and Latin America in recent years. This cannot be the case in the future if Australia is to be a fully effective participant in the UN and (in Africa's case) the Commonwealth. Nor can Australia hope to succeed in future UN candidatures if it attaches a low priority to these regions (ALP 2004, 89) .
These ideas are further complemented with specific policy options: a joint Australia-European Union developmental initiative in a specific African country for the purposes of helping meet the Millennium Development Goals; downgrading Australia's diplomatic representation in Zimbabwe and maintaining sanctions against the Mugabe regime; an increase in humanitarian assistance to Sudan (Darfur); and better coordination of the Commonwealth's contribution to Africa's development challenges (ALP 2004, 124-125) .
Another document which similarly set out in greater detail the ALP's foreign policy perspectives and closely adheres to its traditional foreign policy outlook is the party's National Platform, adopted in April 2007 as the set of policies for the upcoming federal election (ALP 2007) . While again reiterating the ALP's three pillars of foreign policy mentioned above, it is dotted with references to 'middle power activism'. It talks of Labor's 'proud tradition of activism in international affairs', noting that Labor will make renewing Australia's tradition of creative, middle power diplomacy a priority. While Australia is not a super power, it is nonetheless a significant power with a keen interest in shaping the international strategic order. Labor will practise creative and activist diplomacy by building coalitions with like-minded states to create the political momentum necessary to bring about multilateral diplomatic outcomes in the national interest (ALP 2007, 227 ).
Such ideas are followed by a review of the importance of the multilateral global rules-based system as encapsulated in the form of the UN, and the ALP's willingness to work within that system towards its reform and perpetual importance (ALP 2007, 231-232) .
Finally, the document also recognises 'the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean Rim as a region for achieving the long-term objectives of our foreign and economic policies', noting that the ALP would 'build our relationships with the Indian Ocean Rim and the emerging economies of Southern Africa' (ALP 2007, 235) . This recognition of the need to engage with the African region is made more explicit a few lines later:
Labor will rectify the emerging pattern of Australian disengagement from the African continent. Africa lies front and centre in the international community's global development challenge. Australia must re-engage with Africa and, to this end, Labor will establish an AfricaAustralia Council as a vehicle for deepening this country's commitment to some of the poorest countries on the planet. Africa also presents significant opportunities for Australian business-as well as enhancing Australia's multilateral leverage through the UN system (ALP 2007, 236) .
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From Howard to Abbott: two decades of partisan foreign policy towards Africa
Having outlined how the foreign policy outlooks of Australia's two major political parties highlight a partisan approach to engagement with Africa, this section will examine how such differences were exhibited in substantial foreign policy engagement during the past two decades. As the complexities of such a long period cannot be done justice in the remaining space, this section will outline only the main contours of the differences in that engagement.
In broad terms, the Howard government, while not completely uninterested in African engagement, was rather slow and reactive in recognising the growth of Australian interests on the continent and, influenced by its foreign policy outlook, only ever maintained a steady engagement with the country's sole substantial commercial partner-South Africa. On the development cooperation front, for most of John Howard's four terms in power, Africa was 'off the menu'. On the other hand, the ALP after 2007 moved resolutely to enhance engagement, most visibly in support of development cooperation with Africa and Australian economic interests on the continent, and enhancement of diplomatic contacts (Lyons 2010 (Lyons , 2011 Mickler and Lyons 2013) . Enhanced engagement with Africa was compatible with the ALP's foreign policy outlook of middle-power activism and, while African engagement was never at the core of Labor's foreign policy agenda, it was a policy in its own right, even if partially driven by the country's pursuit of a UN Security Council seat and expanding overseas aid budget. Finally, the Abbott government, although rhetorically still devoted to supporting at least Australian economic interests in Africa, displayed a lack of interest in African issues, justifying such a course with its own adherence to the Coalition's traditional, more regionally and bilaterally minded foreign policy outlook.
Howard's reactive engagement, 1996-2007
Until the early 2000s, the Howard government had only one substantial dealing with African issues, and that was the failed 1996 UN Security Council membership bid. Although the Coalition inherited the bid from the Keating government and made an attempt to support it (even appointing Malcolm Fraser as a special envoy to lobby for African votes), the campaign ended rather terribly for Australia; it lost in the secondround run-off with Portugal, polling only 57 votes compared to Portugal's 124 (UN 1996) . During this time, Australia's only other engagement with African issues was the government's policy of maintaining a traditional focus on South Africa, and this was obvious in the fairly regular meetings between Australian and South African trade ministers from 1997 onwards (Fischer 1997) .
During the Howard government's whole four terms in office, no Africa-related foreign policy issue was more high profile and demanding of Howard's focus than that of Zimbabwe and its 'flawed' presidential election in 2002. It was simultaneously the peak of Howard's interest in African issues and a low point in Australia's overall relations with South Africa (DFAT 2002, 56) . A good indication of the centrality of this episode in Howard's whole engagement with Africa is provided in his autobiography, where the only African issue to receive any substantial mention is the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting's (CHOGM's) Zimbabwe episode (Howard 2011, 523-526) .
At the 2002 CHOGM in Australia, Howard, Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki were appointed as a 'Troika of Leaders' tasked with engaging Zimbabwe's President Mugabe over violence and intimidation issues preceding the presidential election in Zimbabwe (McKinnon 2004, 406) . In 2002, the Troika announced Zimbabwe's suspension from the councils of the Commonwealth, with Howard espousing a particularly hard-lined stance, which at the 2003 CHOGM in Nigeria caused a further rift between Australia and prominent African members of the Commonwealth (Ford 2003, 27-28; McDougall 2005, 345; Onslow 2013; Pijovic 2014, 392-393) . 8 Howard's intransigence on Zimbabwe's suspension particularly alienated South Africa's President Mbeki, causing a significant strain between the two states. According to Howard's (2011, 526) The mid-2000s saw the Howard government's only significant policy moves aimed at enhancing engagement with African states. In view of the dearth of consular support in West Africa (only covered by one post in Nigeria) and the growing Australian commercial (mostly mining) interests in the region, the Howard government opened a high commission in Ghana in 2004 (DFAT 2005, 71) . The following year, and driven by Australian commercial interests, Australia also opened an Austrade-run consulate in Libya (Downer and Vaile 2004) .
As far as development cooperation was concerned, the Howard government made it clear in its early Annual Reports on Australian aid that the aid program would focus 'on the Asia Pacific, with Papua New Guinea, Pacific island countries and the poorest regions of East Asia the areas of highest priority', and that it would 'respond selectively to development needs in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East' (DFAT 1998, 13) . In the late 1990s, this was followed by a further narrowing of the geographic and sectoral focus of development assistance towards the African continent, now concentrating on only a handful of countries-primarily South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe-and 'good governance' programs and humanitarian assistance (AusAID 2006, 6) . Overall, bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa during the Howard years never exceeded AU$100 million annually, and for the most part stayed just above AU$50 million.
Labor's proactive engagement, 2007-13
In contrast to the Howard government's generally reactive engagement with Africa, the Labor government from its early days moved proactively to revive links with the continent. On a number of occasions, Labor's first Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stephen Smith (2008 Smith ( , 2009b Smith ( , 2009c Smith ( , 2010d , highlighted that Africa had traditionally received less attention and focus than it deserved in Australian foreign policy, and that his government was dedicated to 'broadening' and 'deepening' its foreign policy engagement with the African continent.
9 Overall, it could be argued that much of what happened in terms of foreign policy engagement with Africa during the Labor years can be viewed in the context of two significant policy drivers: the UN Security Council membership campaign and the Labor government's dedication to increase its official development assistance (ODA) to 0.5 percent of gross national income by 2015 (Rudd 2007) . However, regardless of what helped drive it, the overall bilateral as well as continent-wide focus on Africa during the Labor years was consistent with the ALP's foreign policy outlook of middle-power activism.
Throughout 2008, the Labor government made clear its desire to enhance foreign policy engagement with Africa. Although this was in 2008 still mostly rhetorical, the following year saw a flurry of diplomatic exchanges and visits that would offer policy substance to the government's already articulated desire to 'broaden' and 'deepen' relations with African states. The year 2009 saw Smith become Australia's first Minister for Foreign Affairs to attend and address the Executive Council of the African Union in Ethiopia (Smith 2009a) . 10 A few months later, Australia's governor general, Quentin Bryce, toured nine African countries (GG 2009 ). Both Smith and the governor general probably left a positive impression on at least some African leaders, as, following their visits (and in a matter of four months), Australia experienced a rather unprecedented flurry of highlevel bilateral visits by African delegations. The country was, in turn, visited by the foreign ministers of Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, Botswana and Mozambique (Smith 2009d . Hence, in the space of around one month, Australia had been visited by more high-level African ministers than during the whole four terms of the Howard government.
In January 2010, Smith (2010a) again visited Africa-this time Botswana and South Africa. Shortly after Smith's trip, Australia was visited by Botswana's President Ian Khama and, several weeks later, there followed visits from Erastus Mwencha, the deputy chairman of the African Union Commission; South Africa's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Susan van der Merwe; and Zimbabwe's Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti (Smith 2010b (Smith , 2010c .
The change in Australian foreign ministers did not have an adverse effect on the government's engagement with Africa. On becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rudd made almost the same number of visits to Africa in a single year (2011) as his two predecessors (Stephen Smith and Alexander Downer) had done in roughly 14 years (Rudd's six trips versus Downer and Smith's seven). In January 2011, Rudd (2011a) was in Ethiopia, meeting with the country's prime and foreign ministers and fronting the African Union. In June 2011, he visited Equatorial Guinea for the opening session of another African Union summit (Rudd 2011b ). Rudd's second visit to the African Union would have served the purpose of highlighting to African diplomats and ministers Australia's commitment to fostering greater engagement with the continent, and further strengthening its candidature for the UN Security Council, particularly given the dearth of bilateral ties between Australia and Equatorial Guinea. A month later, and in the context of the serious famine affecting the Horn of Africa, Rudd also visited Kenya and Somalia (Gillard and Rudd 2011) . During this time, Australia also formally recognised South Sudan (Rudd 2011c ). Because of the government's drive in extending diplomatic relations with African states, by the end of Labor's time in office, Australia had established diplomatic relations with all 54 African countries, up from 41 when it entered office (Mickler and Lyons 2013, 3) .
In late October 2011, Australia hosted another CHOGM, this time in Perth. The choice of the venue symbolised the country's awareness of the necessity for its foreign policy to 'Look West' if it was to be successful in achieving the short-term goal of UN Security Council membership and the long-term goal of greater foreign policy engagement with Africa and the Indian Ocean region. The most notable Africa-related issue at the CHOGM was the launch of the Mining for Development initiative, aimed at helping 'developing countries use their natural resources to improve their economies in a sustainable manner' through the establishment of the International Mining for Development Centre in Perth (Gillard 2011) . While the initiative itself was nominally global in focus, a large number of the countries it worked with were African.
Rudd's term as Minister for Foreign Affairs ended in late February 2012, and one of his last overseas trips was to Ethiopia. In late January 2012, Rudd (2012a) visited Ethiopia for a second time, formally opening the new chancery building of the Australian Embassy (which the Labor government had opened in 2011), signing a bilateral development agreement with the country, and again attending the African Union summit.
An important aspect of Australia's enhanced diplomatic and economic engagement with Africa during the Labor years was the Africa Down Under (ADU) mining conference, held annually in Perth. Whilst the ADU had been running since 2003, it was only from 2007 that policymakers started to recognise its strategic importance for enhancing Australia's commercial interests in Africa, and this was exhibited by the move to have all of Australia's African-based heads of mission attend the conference from 2007 onwards.
11 The government's high-profile ministerial representation at the ADU also indicated its strong support for enhancing commercial and trade links with Africa. (DFAT 2011, 71; Rudd 2012b; B. Carr 2014, 149, 451-453) . The Labor government's policy of supporting the ADU and Australian commercial interests by expanding diplomatic contacts with African states, which could help foster an environment more conducive to economic activity, represented a markedly different way to how the Coalition's engagement with Africa had operated, and was arguably the 'newest' aspect of Labour's new engagement with Africa (Pijovic 2013, 112 ).
Labor's third Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bob Carr, followed both Smith and Rudd in enhancing engagement with African states. This was perhaps best evidenced by his announcements of a planned opening of a new Australian embassy in Senegal (a first ever Australian embassy to French-speaking West Africa) and Australia's intention to join the African Development Bank (B. Carr 2012; Carr and Swan 2012). The intention to open a post in Senegal was a further indication of broadening ties with African states and supporting Australian commercial interests in Africa, while membership of the African Development Bank indicated interest in a longer-term development and foreign policy engagement with the continent. Australia was prepared to invest around AU$88 million to join the African Development Bank and also make an initial contribution of around AU$161 million to join the African Development Fund (Ripoll 2013) . Such a serious expenditure, in itself worth more than half of what the total Australian ODA to sub-Saharan Africa was at the time, is unlikely to have been committed to for purely short-term expediency, and was in any case recommended by the 2011 Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness (Hollway et al. 2011, 11-12, 141) .
Overall, Australia's aid to Africa during the Labor years experienced an almost unprecedented expansion, which saw a fourfold increase in Australia's aid to the continent from roughly AU$90 million in 2007-08 to AU$436 million in 2011 -12 (DFAT 2015a . In addition to the overall growth in aid to Africa and willingness to join the African Development Bank, other development initiatives also displayed the government's interest in a more long-term development engagement with Africa. In 2010-11, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID 2011, 61) launched the Australia Africa Community Engagement Scheme, a funding cooperative program between the government and 10 Australian non-governmental organisations worth around AU$90 million over five years.
12 And then there was also the growth in the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research's expenditure on programs in Africa, from only 1 percent of the organisation's overall expenditure in 2008-09 to 24 percent by -13 (AusAID 2008 , 60, 2012 ).
Abbott's return to reactive engagement, 2013-15
While the Labor years gave rise to a notion that Australia had enduring national interests in Africa which could not simply disappear with a change in government (Makinda 2015, 55) , the actions taken by the Abbott Coalition government between 2013 and 2015 strongly implied that, even if such interests could not be wished away, they could be ignored. What became very clear from the outset of the Abbott government was that it entertained only a marginal interest in engagement with Africa.
Most obviously, the overall rhetorical commitment to engagement with Africa exhibited during the Labor years was gone. Save for a short interview given while in South Africa attending Nelson Mandela's funeral in late 2013, Prime Minister Abbott (2013a Abbott ( , 2013b never delivered any foreign policy speeches which touched on Australian engagement with Africa, or African issues. On the other hand, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, whose 'innovations' in foreign policy thinking included an emphasis on the 'Indo-Pacific' (as opposed to 'only' the Asia-Pacific) and Australia's status as a 'top-20 country' (as opposed to 'only' a middle power), still largely adhered to the Coalition's traditional foreign policy outlook of focusing on regional engagement and prioritising bilateral links and economic diplomacy.
Bishop's conceptualisation of the 'Indo-Pacific' region, on the 'Indo' side, mainly concerned India and the Indian Ocean Rim Association countries, of which the most prominent African one is South Africa. Her only visit to mainland Africa during the Abbott years was to South Africa, the country with the strongest cultural, historical and, most importantly, trade and commercial links with Australia (Bishop 2014b) . Although Bishop's emphasis on the 'Indo-Pacific' was at least rhetorically slightly different from the Howard-era emphasis on the 'Asia-Pacific', in practical terms her engagement with Africa was very similar to that of Howard-an engagement with African issues seen primarily through commercial links in general and links with South Africa in particular.
Even being a 'top-20 country' and more than Labor's middle power did not necessarily translate into greater engagement with African states and issues. On more than one occasion, and especially when speaking about development engagement, Bishop made it clear that her focus was primarily on the region. In a 2015 address to the Lowy Institute, Bishop emphasised that '[w]e have a particular responsibility to promote stability and prosperity for the nations of the Pacific', where Australia's development contribution could make a difference, contrasting this with Africa, where [e] vidence shows that our total aid to Africa, before this Budget, made up less than 0.7 percent of total ODA flows and it is a fact that Europe and the United States have primary responsibility for development outcomes in Africa just as Australia has primary responsibility for development outcomes in the Pacific (Bishop 2015c ).
The Abbott government also exhibited a noticeable lack of substantive support for Australian economic interests in Africa. On the one hand, Bishop was active overall in supporting the ADU, sending a video message in 2014 and attending and delivering a speech in 2015, where she announced the establishment of the Advisory Group on Australia-Africa Relations (Bishop 2015d) . 13 This served as an encouragement that the government was keen on at least maintaining a focus on economic diplomacy in engagement with Africa. On the other hand, any encouragement such pronouncements could generate was already partially offset by the Coalition's shelving of the planned opening of an Australian embassy in Senegal (Hockey and Robb 2013) . Given that the rationale for not opening a post in Senegal was a lack of funds and the 'budget emergency' the Coalition had inherited from Labor, the government made it implicitly clear that it was not interested in greater engagement with Africa when the May 2015 budget offered funds for five new Australian diplomatic posts, none of which were in Africa (Bishop 2015b) .
However, there were other indicators of the government's disinterest in engagement with Africa: the 2014 Ebola episode and successive cuts to the Africa aid budget. As the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa intensified and the USA, UK and other countries moved quickly to provide medical personnel and troops to help fight the disease, Australia limited its contributions to funds for the World Health Organization, taking some eight months to finally dispatch a small force of health workers to the disease-stricken region (Jabour 2014; Health Workers 2014; Bishop 2014c) .
As far as development cooperation was concerned, the government decided against joining the African Development Bank and, in its 2014 and 2015 budgets and Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlooks, successively cut aid to Africa dramatically (Australian Government 2014, 3; Dornan 2014; Mickler and Pijovic 2015, 115-118) . By the end of the Abbott government, Australia's total ODA to sub-Saharan Africa had been cut by some 50 percent (from AU$186.9 million in 2014-15 to AU$93 million in 2015-16) and its bilateral aid to the region by some 70 percent (from AU$106 million to AU $31.8 million) (DFAT 2014 (DFAT , 2015b .
Regardless of Bishop's publicly proclaimed support for engagement with African issues, that support remained largely rhetorical. By adhering to the Coalition's traditional foreign policy outlook, Bishop's government was 'by default' only interested in bilateral relationships with traditional partners and a focus on the region. Its regional focus was heavily determined by geography, which Bishop (2014a Bishop ( , 2015a made clear on several occasions, arguing that 'geography does inform our thinking' and 'geography will be our destiny'. Africa simply had no place in such a geocentric approach to foreign policy engagements.
Conclusion
This article has aimed to contribute further empirical detail to the argument that Australia's foreign policy is not always bipartisan and, when it comes to issues and regions traditionally conceptualised as sitting at the periphery of the country's overall foreign policy agenda, such partisan differences are visible. This should be seen as building on the arguments already made by Matthews and Ravenhill almost three decades ago, when their research highlighted a certain degree of partisanship in Australia's foreign policy elite opinion.
Australia's two major political parties do exhibit foreign policy outlooks which offer differing conceptualisations of the country's place in the world and foreign policy priorities.
However, given the general continuity of the country's foreign policy engagement with issues, countries and regions perceived to offer primal and significant security and economic well-being for the country, such foreign policy outlooks largely serve the purposes of electoral differentiation. Hence, on one level, there appears to be bipartisanship in Australian foreign policy.
On another level, when engaging with the relationships and issues that have traditionally been perceived as having rather minimal economic and security importance for the country, there have been notable partisan differences. While the argument of this article has been that engagement with Africa is one such issue receiving partisan support, there is scope for greater generalisation. Further work is necessary to determine whether or to what extent other traditionally peripheral areas of Australian foreign policy have received a similar kind of partisanship in the past, and the areas for exploration could include Australia's engagement with Latin America, eastern Europe and the Middle East.
There is also scope for further work on greater theoretical and analytical development of these two levels of foreign policy, highlighting the qualitative differences in the nature of policymaking towards regions and issues perceived as fundamental or peripheral to a country's overall security and economic well-being. As this article has argued, peripheral areas of foreign policy may be more prone to elitist and fundamental areas more prone to pluralist approaches to policymaking (McDonald 2015) . Hence, the most salient factor allowing different Australian governments to perceive engagement with Africa in differing terms has been the foreign policy outlook of a particular political party. In the past two decades, Coalition governments have, on the whole, exhibited a traditional, 'regionally' minded foreign policy outlook, which made it easier to adopt and justify a fairly reactive and generally disinterested approach to engagement with African issues and states. On the other hand, driven by their own traditionally more 'internationalist' foreign policy outlook, Labor governments have found it easier to justify and show a proactive interest in foreign policy engagement with Africa. It is likely that such partisan differences will remain highly salient drivers of this foreign policy (dis)engagement, at least until there is a change in the perception of Africa's importance for Australia's security and economic well-being.
Notes
1. This bipartisanship on the fundamentals of Australian foreign policy has only been tested on issues of the country's involvement in wars (Gyngell and Wesley 2007, 150-151; McDonald 2013) . 2. The term 'Africa' is employed throughout the article to denote both African issues and states.
It is also used to highlight the dominant political and public discourse on engagement with African states. While the African continent is home to a very diverse set of 54 states, the traditional lack of foreign policy engagement with most of them, coupled with the general lack of knowledge about African states, allows Australian policymakers and the wider public to refer to the engagement with the continent in such generic terms. 3. Looking even beyond Australia, Allan Patience (2014, 215) has noted that, for some countries, the idea of the middle power has become 'an ideology of foreign policy'. 4. 'In understanding party politics, one should never underestimate the constant pressure to comply with the party line and uphold tribal solidarity' (Latham 2014, 55) . 5. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to engage more thoroughly with this issue, it can be posited that the factors influencing the making of foreign policy towards certain issues and regions will be different depending on where the issue or region in question sits on the overall foreign policy agenda. The author's research into the drivers of Australia's foreign policy engagement with Africa suggests that issues such as public opinion, media pressure or interest groups were not highly salient in affecting decision-making. However, on issues more centrally situated on Australia's overall foreign policy agenda, such as the relationship with the USA or engagement with China, public opinion, the media and interest groups are likely to be more salient drivers of foreign policymaking-that is to say, as McDonald (2015, 653) argues, foreign policymaking may be more pluralist than elitist. 6. Examining foreign policy speeches is also a beneficial way of understanding political party foreign policy outlooks and how they are imagined, shaped and adhered to by key decision-makers, but is unfortunately beyond the allowed space limitations of this article. 7. When in government, the ALP did not actually establish such a council. 8. These sanctions are still in place (see DFAT 2015c). 9. There is a striking resemblance in the way Rudd's government used similar rhetoric to that of Whitlam's Labor government in justifying closer engagement with Africa. Smith used the opportunities of giving Africa Day speeches to outline how previous (Liberal National Party) governments had not given enough attention to engagement with Africa, and how his government was harbouring a more positive outlook on African states. In the early 1970s, Whitlam too delivered at least one Africa Day speech in a bid to highlight his government's efforts in re-engaging with African states, especially in their shared opposition to apartheid, and argued that previous (Liberal National Party) governments neglected engagement with Africa, while his government was keen on a more proactive and optimistic engage- 
